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ABSTRACT
Our paper offers a minimalist model of a run on a financial market.  The prime ingredient
is that each risk-neutral investor fears having to liquidate after a run, but before prices can recover
back to fundamental values.  During the urn, only the risk-averse market-making sector is willing
to absorb shares.  To avoid having to possibly liquidate shares at the marginal post-run price–in
which case the market-making sector will already hold a lot of share inventory and thus be more
reluctant to absorb additional shares–all investors may prefer selling their shares into the market
today at the average run price, thereby causing the run itself.  Consequently, stock prices are low
and risk is allocated inefficiently.  Liquidity runs and crises are not caused by liquidity shocks per
se, but by the fear of future liquidity shocks.  
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ivo.welch@yale.eduIncontrasttotheﬁnancialinstitutions literature(e.g., DiamondandDybvig(1983)),
runs on ﬁnancial markets have not been a prime subject of inquiry. Our paper of-
fers a minimalist model of a run on a ﬁnancial market. The main ingredient of
our model is that investors fear (but do not necessarily experience) future liquidity
shocks. This creates two scenarios.
In the good scenario, a risk-neutral public holds most of the risky shares. In-
vestors hit by a liquidity shock in the future will sell to the risk-averse market-
making sector at a “low-inventory price,” which will be close to the risk-neutral
value of the asset. In the good scenario, the market-making sector provides the
public with low-cost insurance against liquidity shocks.
In the bad scenario, every investor conjectures that other investors intend to
sell today, thus causing a “run.” By joining the pool of selling requests today, an
individual investor can expect to receive the average price that is necessary to in-
duce the market-making sector to absorb all tendered shares today. The investor’s
alternative is to not enter the pool and instead to hold onto the shares. In making
this decision, this investor is better oﬀ if he can wait out the storm and realize
the eventual expected asset value. However, if he were randomly hit by the possi-
ble liquidity shock, this investor would need to sell his shares behind the rest of
the public. But, with the market-making sector already holding the shares of other
tendering investors, this post-run price will be worse than the average in-run price
today. If the average in-run price is greater than the expected payoﬀ achieved by
waiting, this investor will join the herd and also sell into the run. If other investors
act alike, the conjecture that other investors sell today ends up being veriﬁed. In
the bad scenario, the market-making sector holds too many shares and provides
the public with high-cost insurance against liquidity shocks.
1Our bad scenario relies either on random or batch execution. However, if execu-
tion is sequential, investors cannot expect to avoid a later place in line by joining
the selling pool. Thus, the last investors (who now know they are last) are better
oﬀ waiting rather than joining the herd and the bad scenario unravels. In reality, ﬁ-
nancial markets lack perfectly sequential execution in at least three circumstances.
First, there is often no sequential execution after a market closure: for example, at
the stock market opening or after a trading halt, markets are often conducted in a
“batch” mode where all orders are crossed at the same price—and, indeed, fears of
stock market runs seem higher around the NYSE opening period.1 Second, even dur-
ing normal trading, sequential execution may break down under the load of orders
ﬂowing in, and investors’ order executions could become random. There is a lot of
anecdotal evidence that sequential execution broke down in the 1987 stock market
crash. Greenwald and Stein (1988, p15f) note that “investors cannot know with any
precision at what prices their orders are executed...trades consummated only min-
utes apart were executed at wildly diﬀerent prices, so that an investor submitting
a market order had virtually no idea where it would be completed.” A tendering
investor, not knowing his place in the queue, would expect to receive some aver-
age price2—and the chain of perfect sequentiality may not just be broken on the
exchange itself, but also in the communication of brokers with the exchanges and
with their investors. This institutional breakdown could lead to an immediate tran-
sition from a situation in which liquidity shocks are not a major concern (as in a
sequential market) to a situation in which they become paramount (as in a batch
market). Third, in many over-the-counter ﬁnancial markets, counterparties need
1Examining market-making inventories at the reopening of the stock markets on September 17,
2002 would allow for an interesting test of our model.
2Yet another interpretation would have a seller be unaware whether he received information
about overvaluation/undervaluation before or after other investors, as in Abreu and Brunnermeier
(2001).
2to be found, and when multiple sellers are searching for counterparties, there is
randomness as to who will ﬁnd the potential buyers ﬁrst.
It is important to point out that our model is not driven by the liquidity shocks
themselves. Instead, prices and market-making inventories are driven by the fear of
future liquidity shocks. Thus, the liquidity shocks might loom in the future and cause
a run today. If underlying exogenous parameters change, high volatility and runs
(low prices, high market-making inventory) can appear and disappear many times
before the liquidity shocks themselves. An empiricist might not even necessarily
recognize the relevance of actual liquidity constraints.
In a sense, the outcome of our model is perplexing. There are no transaction
or search costs or asymmetric information. Investors are numerous, risk-neutral,
and homogeneous. The market-making sector can be very deep with only slight risk
aversion (small discounts to absorb liquidity). Unlike much of the feedback trad-
ing literature, liquidity shocks can loom in the distance and need not be correlated
among investors. Unlike in the ﬁnancial institutions run literature, in our ﬁnancial
markets setting, there are no sequential service constraints, no productive ineﬃ-
ciencies, and no need for investors to join in a run in order to get anything. Rather,
our investors can attempt to “wait out the storm,” and thereby perhaps do better.
And, yet, our ﬁnancial market can produce outcomes in which every investor wants
to sell to avoid selling behind the average investor. Consequently, ineﬃcient bear-
ers of risk (the market-making sector) hold too much of the risky asset. Moreover,
there is an accelerator eﬀect whereby small changes in the likelihood of a liquidity
shock can have big eﬀects on the allocation of risk and the equilibrium price. The
intuition that runs can be driven by investors fearing “to come in last” is solid, and
resonates with many who witnessed the 1987 crash.
3The main assumptions and insights of the model seem both realistic and robust.
Indeed, the analytics of the model are simple, relying only on situations in which
sequential execution breaks down, and on some split of participants into a (poten-
tially only slightly) risk-averse market-making sector and an outside sector living in
fear of potential future liquidity shocks. Not requiring much machinery, the model
hints that run equilibria may not be esoteric but intrinsic to ﬁnancial markets with
capacity limits (just as they are intrinsic for ﬁnancial institutions). This is not to
argue that runs are frequent (indeed, they are very rare!), but that their occurrance
is not logically far-fetched.
After working with exogenous liquidity shocks in Section II, we introduce mar-
gin constraints in Section III. These constraints endogenize the probability of future
investor liquidity concerns, so that a price drop can quickly trigger investors’ fear
of a liquidity run, which in turn can trigger a further price decline, further mar-
gin constraints, etc. In this circumstance, the liquidity run becomes a short-term
high-frequency phenomenon, and normal transaction channels may be quickly over-
whelmed.
Our models work even if investor shocks are independent; however, if investor
shocks are independent, the question of why unaﬀected individuals do not join the
market-making sector becomes pertinent. Our paper contains a long discussion
thereof on page 18, but we believe this is indeed how liquidity runs remain limited
and how they come to an end: unaﬀected investors eventually join the market-
making sector, earning a positive rate of return for doing so, which compensates
them for their residual risk-aversion. With buy and sell orders ﬂowing in more
smoothly, sequential order is restored again. In one sense, the question as to why
the market-making sector does not expand is similar to why banks in a Diamond and
4Dybvig (1983) do not ﬁnd themselves quickly additional backers to avoid ineﬃcient
liquidation.3 Such backers could earn positive expected rates of returns. Unlike in
the ﬁnancial intermediation sector, we believe that this process can occur faster in
a ﬁnancial market sector—and it is this process that naturally limits the depth and
duration of liquidity runs. Taken together—widespread and positively correlated
endogenous liquidity fears and runs interacting with margin constraints—allow our
model to capture at least some of the causal dynamics during a stock market crash.
Our paper now proceeds as follows: Section I lays out the model. The model’s
emphasis is on simplicity. Section II describes the equilibrium under CARA and
CRRA market-making utility. Although we solve the model under perfectly corre-
lated liquidity shocks, we then show that the intuition of our model survives even
if shocks are uncorrelated. (This section also oﬀers an equilibrium model for the
market-making sectors’ inventory in ordinary times.) Section III adds margin con-
straints to our model, which endogenizes the liquidation probability. Section IV
discusses the economics of the equilibrium. Section V relates our work to earlier
papers, particularly the bank-run literature (Diamond and Dybvig (1983)). And Sec-
tion VI concludes.
3After all, banks have existing ﬁnancial links. A similar question is why banks do not simply
sell their loans for (more) cash to other banks. The answer is probably that time and imperfect
information about asset quality play a role—but ultimately, this is how bank runs can come to an
end—and with a net proﬁt for some willing outsiders.
5I The Basic Model Setup
Time 
Investors Trade.








We consider a model with three dates (t = 0,1,2) and two assets: a risk-free bond
in inﬁnitely elastic supply with a gross payoﬀ of $1 at date two and a risky asset
(henceforth, “stock”) with gross random payoﬀ of ˜ Z at date two. For simplicity, we
normalize the date 0 and date 1 price of the bond to be $1. The date 0 and date 1
price of the stock is determined endogenously.
Shares in the stock trade at date 0 and date 1. There are two types of traders in
our market: atomistic individual investors and a competitive market-making sector.
Market-makers constitute an entire sector which encompasses not just the spe-
cialist, but all traders willing to absorb shares upon demand, i.e., regardless of the
(fear of) liquidity shocks. Still, it is reasonable to attribute a ﬁnite risk absorption
capacity to this sector and thus we assume the market-making sector is risk-averse
in aggregate. For example, many institutions and traders do not seem willing to
absorb shares during a ﬁnancial markets crash, and instead prefer to wait it out.4
We also assume that the market-making sector is competitive and is characterized
4Gammill and Marsh (1988) describe the broader market-making sector during the 1987 crash in
great detail. Dennis and Strickland (2002) ﬁnd that institutions are more likely than retail investors
to sell into a dropping market. Indeed, portfolio insurers even precommit to such strategies.
Amihud, Mendelson, and Wood (1990) document the liquidity decline during the 1987 crash, and
describe that “Orders could not be executed, and information on market conditions and on order
execution was delayed. Consequently, much of the burden of responding to the unexpected order
ﬂow fell on the exchange specialists, market makers, and other traders with immediate access to
the trading ﬂoor.” Thus, the market-making sector may be smaller than often assumed, and suﬀer
a steeper and quicker price drop than sketched by our model.
6by a “representative” market-maker with date 0 wealth W0 and date 0 inventory of
zero shares.
Individual investors are identical and endowed with shares which sum to the
total supply of shares (normalized to one). Individual investors are assumed to be
risk-neutral. Importantly, individual investors face a potential liquidity shock at
date 1. We model liquidity shocks in various ways. In Section II, we assume that
each individual investor may be forced to liquidate her shares at date 1 with an ex-
ogenous probability s. After showing that this leads to a non-zero market-making
inventory at date 0, we parameterize the liquidity shocks and market-making util-
ity function. The liquidity shocks are assumed to be perfectly correlated across
investors in Subsection II.A and independent across investors in Subsections II.B
and II.C. In Section III, we endogenize the date 1 liquidation probability s to depend
on the date 0 stock price by introducing margin constraints. Each of these liquidity
assumptions has been employed in related literature, and each oﬀers its own trade
oﬀ of realism and model cleanness.
To recap, there are two important diﬀerences between the market-making sector
and individual investors. First, individual investors are assumed to be risk-neutral
and the market-making sector is risk-averse (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia (1991)).
The former assumption is not crucial to the analysis but captures the fact that the
investing public has considerably more risk absorption capacity than the market-
making sector, and that, in a Pareto eﬃcient outcome, shares should be held by
the investing public (the most eﬃcient bearers of risk). Second, only individual
investors face a potential liquidity shock at date 1. This provides the motivation
for trade between individual investors and the market-making sector at both dates
0 and 1. Moreover, this ensures that only the market-making sector (in equilibrium)
7is willing to buy shares in a run situation, at a price that depends on the market-
making sector’s risk-tolerance. An investor who learns that he is not subject to any
future forced liquidation can join and thereby deepen the market-making sector.5
Individual investors are assumed to submit market orders. Limit orders could
potentially deepen the market-making sector, and are thus not fully considered in
our model. Greenwald and Stein (1988, footnote 16) also note that “limit orders do
not represent an especially attractive alternative under the conditions of October
19th and 20th. An investor’s threshold price should depend on his most current in-
formation, which includes the current market price. Under very volatile conditions,
this can mean resubmitting limit orders on an almost continuous basis, which would
have been extremely diﬃcult to accomplish.”
To close the model, we assume that the equilibrium price is determined by a
zero-utility condition on the representative market-maker. Speciﬁcally, in our batch
execution model, we assume that the price of the stock at each date is set so that
the representative market-maker is indiﬀerent between buying the entire batch and
holding his inventory. Because the representative market-maker is risk averse, this
price is typically decreasing in his inventory. Our zero-utility condition is anal-
ogous to Kyle’s zero-expected-proﬁts condition for a risk-neutral market-making
sector and can be justiﬁed by the joint assumptions that the market-making sector
is competitive and market-makers are free to enter or exit after each date.
There are two equivalent interpretations to the market microstructure which de-
termines the equilibrium price—and both of them can be shown to lead to the same
market-maker demand function and thus identical solutions for our model. One
5Naturally, this investor must have some risk-aversion or limited capital. Otherwise, the market-
making sector itself becomes inﬁnitely deep when the ﬁrst investor appears. Section IV.A discusses
what happens when the aggregate risk tolerance changes in a crisis.
8interpretation is that all orders are batched and executed at an identical “average”
price. For simplicity of exposition, we proceed using this speciﬁc assumption only.
Sell orders from individual investors at each date are batched and then executed
at an average price that yields zero utility for the representative market maker.
Another interpretation is that orders are executed sequentially (with lower prices
for subsequent trades) but in random order. In both cases the investor submits a
market order and is unsure of the exact price at which her shares will be executed.
In the ﬁrst interpretation, we must impose a zero-utility condition in each period
while in the second interpretation we must impose a zero-utility condition on each
trade. Thus, our model applies equally to batch auction markets (e.g., at the NYSE
stock market opening and after a trading halt); and to over-the-counter markets and
to stock market crashes, when limited communication lines to the market-making
sector can change the typical deterministic sequential execution into random exe-
cution.6
II Equilibrium With Exogenous Liquidity Shocks
In what follows, we assume that individual investors are endowed with the entire
supply of shares at date 0 (consistent with an eﬃcient allocation of risk). We an-
alyze only the situations in which individual investors may wish to sell shares at
date 0 due to the fear of a liquidity shock at date 1. These situations are the most
6An alternative setup is provided in Diamond and Verrecchia (1991). Their price setting mech-
anism diﬀers from ours in two respects: market makers earn surplus on inframarginal trades
and they set prices by solving a dynamic optimization problem. The latter implies that market
makers forecast future buys and sells when setting today’s price. Whether or not market-makers
earn surplus is not important for the qualitative results of our model. Solving the market-makers’
price function in a dynamic optimization problem is not tractable in our setup. Nonetheless, our
qualitative results would still obtain, because the important feature of our model is that the price
at t = 1 in the event of a liquidity shock is lower than the price at t = 0.
9interesting because we intend to demonstrate that the fear of liquidity shocks can
lead to substantial market-maker inventories and thus ineﬃcient allocations of risk.
Therefore, we ignore situations in which individual investors want to buy shares at
date 0.
Consider an individual investor who conjectures that a total of α shares will be
sold by individual investors to the market-making sector at date 0 and let p0(α)
denote the date-0 price set by the market makers when α sell orders arrive at date 0.
If this investor also sells her shares at date 0, she will expect to receive the price
p0(α). However, if this investor chooses not to sell her shares at date 0 then either
(i) she will be forced to liquidate her shares with probability s at date 1 or (ii) she
will not be forced to liquidate her shares with probability 1 − s at date 1 and will
optimally wait to receive the expected value of the stock, µ, at date 2. If liquidity
shocks are perfectly correlated (as in Subsection A), the remaining proportion (1−α)
of shares will be liquidated at date 1 if the liquidity shock occurs. If liquidity shocks
are independent (as in Subsection B), the Law of Large Numbers ensures that the
proportion (1−α)·s of shares will be liquidated at date 1. Let p1(q 1(α);α)denote
the date-1 price set by the market-makers when they hold α shares of inventory and
q1(α)new sell orders arrive at date 1. If this investor does not sell at date 0 she
will expect to receive s·p1(q 1(α);α)+ (1 − s)·µ. Thus, it will be optimal for this
investor to sell if and only if
p0(α)≥ s·p1(q 1(α);α)+ (1 − s)·µ. (1)
Notice that if an investor is forced to liquidate at date 1, she receives a lower
selling price than if she had sold at date 0. A risk-averse market-making sector
10implies that p (·)<0, i.e., the market-making sector will require a lower price
(greater risk premium) if it has to buy a greater number of shares. However, if she
is not forced to liquidate at date 1, she receives the expected value of the stock which
is greater than the selling price at date 0. The decision to sell at date 0 depends
critically on the investor’s beliefs about whether other investors will choose to sell
at date 0.
We consider only symmetric Nash equilibria.
Deﬁnition 1 Let F(α) denote the expected net beneﬁt of selling shares at date 0
(compared to not selling) when the investor conjectures that α shares will be sold at
date 0. If liquidity shocks will be perfectly correlated across investors,
F(α)=
if tender today       
p0(α) −
if forced to liquidate tomorrow       
s·p1(q 1(α);α) −
if liquidation
not necessary       
(1 − s)·µ. (2)
where q1(α)= (1−α) in the perfectly correlated shock case, and q1(α)= s·(1−α)
in the independent shock case. Then (i) waiting (α  = 0) is a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium iﬀ F(0) ≤ 0; (ii) selling (α  = 1) is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium iﬀ
F(1) ≥ 0; and (iii) α  ∈ (0,1) is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium iﬀ F(α  ) = 0.
We can immediately demonstrate that (α  = 0) is not a symmetric Nash equilib-
rium if the probability of a liquidity shock is positive.
Theorem 1 Although market-makers are risk-averse and investors are risk-neutral
and not yet liquidity-shocked, the market-making sector holds inventory at date 0 if
there is a positive probability of a liquidity shock (s) at date 1.
Proof: For s>0, F(0)>0,s oα  = 0 is not an equilibrium. 
11The intuition is that if the market-making sector holds zero inventory, it would
be willing to accept the ﬁrst share at its risk-neutral valuation today. Thus, the ﬁrst
seller would avoid the liquidation risk tomorrow without any price penalty today.
Unfortunately, there is little more we can say without parameterizing returns and
the representative market-making sector’s utility function in order to determine the
pt(·) functions. Thus, we now consider two cases. In the ﬁrst case, we assume that
the market-making sector has constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences
and the stock payoﬀ is distributed normal. We solve for the symmetric Nash equi-
libria with perfectly correlated liquidity shocks in Subsection A and independent
liquidity shocks in Subsection B. The CARA plus normality assumptions allow us to
obtain simple closed-form solutions but at the expense of rich comparative statics.
In the second case, we assume that the market-making sector has constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) preferences and the stock payoﬀ is distributed binomial. (For
brevity, we solve only for independent liquidity shocks in the CRRA case.) The CRRA
example yields richer comparative statics, but it can only be solved numerically.
A Example 1: CARA utility, normally distributed payoﬀs, and per-
fectly correlated liquidity shocks
In this example, we assume that (i) the stock payoﬀ ˜ Z is normally distributed with
mean µ and variance σ2, (ii) the market-making sector has the negative exponential
utility function u(w) =− e−γ·w where γ is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion,
and (iii) liquidity shocks are perfectly correlated.
First, we derive the equilibrium pricing function, p0(α). By assumption, this is
the price at which the representative market-maker is indiﬀerent between buying α
12shares at date 0 and maintaining zero inventory of shares. Under the assumptions
of CARA preferences and normally distributed stock payoﬀs, the price p0(α)solves
E[−e
−γ· ˜ W2 ] = E[e
−γ·W0 ] =⇒ E[ ˜ W2 ] − γ·Var[ ˜ W2 ]/2 = W0 . (3)
where ˜ W2 ≡ W0 + α·(˜ Z − p0). Solving yields p0(α)= µ − γ·σ2·α/2.
Now we derive the price that obtains at date 1 in the event of a liquidity shock.
Let p1(1 − α;α)denote the price at which the representative market-maker is in-
diﬀerent between buying (1−α) new shares at date 1 and maintaining an inventory
of α shares. Under the assumptions of CARA preferences and normally distributed
stock payoﬀs, the price p1(1 − α;α)solves
E[ ˜ W2 + (1 − α)·(˜ Z − p1)]− γ·Var[ ˜ W2 + (1 − α)·(˜ Z − p1)]/2
= E[ ˜ W2 ] − γ·Var[ ˜ W2 ]/2
=⇒ p1(1 − α;α)= µ − (1 + α)·γ·σ
2/2 . (4)
Substituting p0(α)and p1(1 − α;α)into our deﬁnition of F(α)yields the fol-
lowing result:
Theorem 2 If liquidity shocks are perfectly correlated across investors there is a










if s ≤ 1/2
1 if s>1/2
. (5)
Proof: Substitute the pricing functions into equation 2. Note that F(0)>0 for all s>0 and
Fα , the derivative of F with respect to α , is negative. Thus, there are two possibilities. If
F(1) ≥ 0 then there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium α  = 1 and if F(1)<0 there is
13a unique mixed strategy, α , where F(α  ) = 0. For s>1/2, F(1)>0 thus α  = 1. For
s ≤ 1/2 solving for α  yields the result. 
Equilibrium market-maker inventory increases in the probability of a liquidity
shock. The eﬃcient outcome would be for market makers to hold no inventory at
date zero, but the desire of investors to preempt other investors forces the risk-
averse market-making sector to ineﬃciently hold shares. This ineﬃcient allocation
of risk is reﬂected in a lower equilibrium price for the stock. Moreover, the market-
maker inventory is convex in the liquidation probability. This is an “accelerator”
eﬀect: fear of other investors liquidating has an immediate inﬂuence on each in-
vestor’s own decision to liquidate. For very small values of s, i.e., very little chance
of future liquidity shocks, an investor sees other investors waiting and thus does
not mind waiting herself. The market-making sector needs to hold almost no shares
today (α  close to zero) and the outcome is close to the Pareto-optimum. With in-
creasing s, the fraction of tendering investors rises ever more quickly since the ﬁrst
derivative of α  with respect to s is ∂α 
/∂s = 1/(1 − s)2 which is increasing in s.
In fact, even if there is “only” a 50-50 chance of investors facing a future liquidity
shock, and even if the market-making sector is extremely risk-averse (γ →∞ ), risk-
neutral investors ﬁnd themselves unwilling to hold any stock today. Naturally, this
is an extremely ineﬃcient outcome.
Although these are not distinct equilibria, there is a ﬂavor of two distinct sce-
narios here: a good scenario, in which the probability of liquidation is low, and the
market-making sector is not holding much inventory; and a bad (or run) scenario,
in which the probability of individual liquidation is average, and the risk-averse
14market-making sector has to absorb all shares in the economy.7
Interestingly, withCARAutility, therisk-absorptioncapacityofthemarket-making
sector (γ) and the riskiness of the stock (σ) play no role in the equilibrium outcome
(α ). Expanding the market-making sector in both good and bad times would not
solve the allocation problem created by the fear of facing a liquidity shock.8 The
reason is that there are two countervailing forces when the market-making sector is
deep (or payoﬀ variance is low): On the one hand, the average in-run price is higher
because the market-making sector is close to risk neutral. On the other hand, the
marginal price obtained after the run is also higher. In the case of constant ab-
solute risk aversion preferences, these two eﬀects exactly oﬀset each other in the
investors’ selling decision. With CARA preferences, the market-making price is lin-
ear in inventory. Although risk aversion and payoﬀ variance aﬀect the slope of the
linear demand curve, they do not aﬀect the relation between average and marginal
prices. Thus, the tradeoﬀ between tendering today and waiting is independent of
these parameters. The prime ingredient in this version of our model is investors’
fear of future liquidation, s.
7 It is straightforward to show if s ≤ 1/2 the volatility of stock returns (˜ R0,1 ≡ (p1 − p0)/p0 )i s
given by
σ(˜ R0,1 ) =
γ·σ2·s
2·(1 − s)·µ − γ·σ2·s
. (6)
As expected, the underlying value volatility σ2 is distinct from the stock return volatility. The
volatility of stock returns increases in s, γ, and σ2 and decreases in µ. Moreover, the change in
volatility increases in s. Thus, seemingly small changes in liquidation probability s can signiﬁcantly
change market volatility.
8Of course, when the market-making sector is deep, prices are close to risk-neutral even if no
risk-neutral investor is willing to hold shares and thus the welfare loss is small.
15B Example 2: CARA utility, normally distributed payoﬀs, and in-
dependent liquidity shocks
The key diﬀerence between the perfectly correlated and independent liquidity shock
cases is that in the former case, all investors who did not sell at date 0 must liquidate
with probability s at date 1 whereas in the latter case, proportion s of investors who
did not sell at date 0 must liquidate with probability 1 at date 1.
The derivation of the equilibrium price function at date 0 is the same in both
cases. Thus, as we demonstrated above, if an individual investor conjectures that
a total of α shares will be sold by individual investors to the market-making sector
at date 0, she will still receive the price p0(α) = µ − γ·σ2·α/2 if she sells at
date 0. However, as stated earlier, because liquidity shocks are independent across
individual investors we know with probability one (by the Law of Large Numbers)
that a proportion (1−α)·s of shares will be liquidated at date 1. Let p1((1−α)·s;α)
denote the date-1 price set by the market makers when (1 − α)·s new sell orders
arrive at date 1 and the market-making sector already held α shares. By assumption,
p1((1−α)·s;α)is the price at which the representative market-maker is indiﬀerent
between buying (1 − α)·s new shares at date 1 and maintaining an inventory of α
shares. Under the assumptions of CARA preferences and normally distributed stock
payoﬀs, the price p1((1 − α)·s;α)solves
E[ ˜ W2 + s·(1 − α)·(˜ Z − p1)]− γ·Var[ ˜ W2 + s·(1 − α)·(˜ Z − p1)]/2
= E[ ˜ W2 ] − γ·Var[ ˜ W2 ]/2
⇒ p1(s·(1 − α);α)= µ − [2·α + (1 − α)·s]·γ·σ
2/2 . (7)
16Replacing the perfect correlation shocks p1((1 − α);α)from the previous section
with its independent shocks equivalent p1((1 − α)·s;α)in our deﬁnition of F(α)
yields the following result:
Theorem 3 If liquidity shocks are independent across investors there is a unique










if s ≤ 1/2
1 if s>1/2
. (8)
Proof: Substitute the pricing functions into equation 2, with q1(α)= s·(1−α). Note that
F(0)>0 for all s>0 and Fα , the derivative of F with respect to α , is negative. Thus,
there are two possibilities. If F(1) ≥ 0 then there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium
α  = 1 and if F(1)<0 there is a unique mixed strategy, α , where F(α  ) = 0.F o r
s>1/2, F(1)>0 thus α  = 1. For s ≤ 1/2 solving for α  yields the result. 
Again, market-maker inventory increases in the probability of a liquidity shock,
and the model features the “accelerator” eﬀect: fear of other investors liquidating
has an immediate inﬂuence on each investor’s own decision to liquidate. The ﬁrst
derivative of α  with respect to s is ∂α 
/∂s = 2·s/(1 − s)3. Thus, around s = 0.23,
the fraction of investors that unload their shares onto the market-making sector
changes one-to-one with changes in s. Above s = 0.23, even small changes in the
perceived fraction of investors can cause large changes in market-making inventory
and equilibrium pricing. Again, even if there is “only” a 50-50 chance of investors
facing a future liquidity shock, and even if the market-making sector is extremely
risk-averse (γ →∞ ), risk-neutral investors ﬁnd themselves unwilling to hold any
stock today.
Unlike in the perfectly correlated shocks version of our model, in this indepen-
dent liquidity shock version of our model, we know with certainty that the price at
17date 1 will be lower than the price at date 0. This creates an arbitrage opportunity.
One might reasonably ask why a market-maker would buy shares at date 0 when
she knows for sure that the price will be lower at date 1. But this is “just” a model
artifact caused by our law-of-large number assumption, though: In our model, there
is no uncertainty about the number of liquidity shocked investors next period. In
reality, however, there are many sources of uncertainty that make it possible that
the price at date 1 will be higher than the price at date 0. For example, we could
introduce some uncertainty about whether any liquidity shocks will appear. Or, a
change in the environment which make liquidity shocks unlikely for some investors
will cause them to buy the stock at date 1 and drive up its price. One might also rea-
sonably ask why investors do not short the stock at date 0 and buy it back at date 1.
Shorting stock, however, might be extremely diﬃcult during such runs. Alterna-
tively, uncertainty about the timing of the stock price bounce back can potentially
introduce a source of risk (costly margin calls) that limits the aggressiveness of
short positions at date 0 (see, e.g., Liu and Longstaﬀ (2000)).9
A more pertinent question—because it is not an artifact of the lack of uncer-
tainty in the number of liquidity shocked investors—is why noone simply waits to
be a standby investor to buy only at the bottom of the crash. But, this question
is bigger than just our model. What prevented an investor from becoming rich
during the 1987 (or any other) crash? Recent U.S. crashes and mini-crashes indeed
showed immediate bouncebacks, and it is these temporary liquidity and price drop
phenomena that require (at least a partial) explanation.
9Rational expectations models relying on information are similarly concerned with breaking
backward induction arbitrage links include Dow and Gorton (1994) and Allen, Morris, and Shin
(2002). See also Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
18There are a number of answers. First, there may be (unmodelled) uncertainty
about the timing of the end of the crash and about a simultaneous revision in the
expected return of the assets. Indeed, we sometimes see persistent market calami-
ties following ﬁnancial market crashes, we sometimes see sharp drops followed
by immediate reversals—presumably with investors recognizing that their liquidity
constraints will not bind, that they can safely join the market-making sector, and
that the good state is about to return (see footnote 4). Such investors should do
well. Indeed, we believe this is how temporary crashes ultimately end: with enough
investors moving from the liquidity-fearing sector to the market-making sector. Sec-
ond, execution in the ﬁnal stage, the termination of the run, may be as uncertain
as it is in the run initiation. A standby investor may try to wait until the bottom of
the market to buy shares for a song, but he may not be sure whether his buy orders
will be executed at the immediate last-investor run price or whether he may miss
this opportunity altogether. After all, the price in our model drops sharply and
then rebounds sharply back to µ. To the extent that other investors also wish to
jump back in, and to the extent that sequential execution is fragile or non-existent,
the spirit of our model is not incongruent with the fact that neither of the authors
ended up excessively wealthy after the last stock market crash. Third, one may
wonder why in a more dynamic context, there is not enough buﬀer stock to prevent
such liquidity runs in the ﬁrst place. But it is costly to create stand-by liquidity.
For example, it would be costly for a large investor to carry zero-inventory most of
the time (so as to be almost risk-neutral) and who is lurking around only for the
opportunities presented in a crash. If crashes are rare, this may not be a proﬁtable
use of resources (Greenwald and Stein (1988, p.19)). Similarly, individuals may not
ﬁnd it in their interests to maintain a buﬀer stock of very liquid assets that could
ensure them against the rare probabilities of liquidity shocks.
19In sum, we believe liquidity runs and crashes to be suﬃciently rare phenomena
that moderating market forces may not be suﬃciently proﬁtable to grip instanta-
neously, but may require a short period of time.
C Example 3: CRRA utility
Although the CARA equilibrium illustrates the importance of the fear of liquidity
shocks, the linearity of the market-maker’s demand function reduces the richness
of its comparative statics. To obtain a non-linear demand curve, we now assume
that the representative market-maker has constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)





where γ is the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion. We further assume that the stock payoﬀ ˜ Z takes on one of two values:
U with probability π and D with probability 1 − π. Absence of arbitrage requires
U>p t >D .
Again, the equilibrium pricing function, p0(α), ensures that the representative
market-maker is indiﬀerent between buying α shares at date 0 and maintaining zero




















This price function is the same whether liquidity shocks are perfectly correlated or
independent across investors.
20If a liquidity shock occurs and they are perfectly correlated across investors the
















π·[W2(U)]1−γ + (1 − π)·[W2(D)]1−γ
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π·[W2(U)]1−γ + (1 − π)·[W2(D)]1−γ
 
. (11)
Unfortunately, there are no closed-form expressions for the price functions,
p0(α), p1((1 − α);α), and p1((1 − α)·s;α). However, a simple numerical algo-
rithm can ﬁnd them exactly. We can then use a simple search algorithm to ﬁnd the
equilibrium inventory of the market-making sector (α ).
Although we do not have a general proof of uniqueness for α  nor for the mono-
tonicity of the comparative statics for α  with respect to important parameters of
the model, an examination of a large region of the relevant parameter space yields
consistent results. For the numerical examples that follow, we have chosen reason-
able base-case parameters to represent market-maker wealth (roughly 1/10 of the
value of the risky asset) and risk-aversion (γ = 3). For all cases, it can be shown
that α  is unique. Figure 1 graphs the market-making sector’s equilibrium holdings
(α ) as a function of exogenous parameters for the case of independent liquidity
shocks across investors. The numerical results are qualitatively similar when liq-
21uidity shocks are perfectly correlated across investors. Typically, we ﬁnd that the
market-making sector holds more inventory (α )
• when the market-making sector has greater wealth;
• when the market-making sector has greater risk-absorption capacity (risk-
aversion coeﬃcient γ is lower);
• when the asset is less risky (U − D is smaller holding the mean payoﬀ πU +
(1 − π)D constant);
• when the probability of a liquidity shock (s) is higher.
We already know from the CARA case that it is not the steepness of the de-
mand curve itself (i.e., the “depth”) that matters to market-making inventory: higher
risk-capacity for the market-making sector does not only allow investors to unload
shares at an attractive price in a run, but it also allows them to enjoy a better price
after a run. Instead, what matters is the second derivative of the demand curve.
Just as in the CARA case, fear of liquidity can cause the run, and the sensitivity of
α to s increases in s. But, in the CRRA case, the other parameters (such as wealth,
risk-aversion, and riskiness) matter for the relative share allocations to the extent
that they bend the market-making demand function.
III Equilibrium With Margin Constraints
Margin calls, which force investors to sell more shares if the share price declines,
are well-known to be important during ﬁnancial market crashes (see, e.g., Chowdhry
and Nanda (1998)). Our model does not require margin calls, but margin calls can
22endogenize liquidity constraints, and can produce very high-frequency “phase tran-
sitions” (as well as multiple equilibria). They can amplify the already existing liq-
uidity run accelerator eﬀect.
We now sketch a simple model of margin constraints. As before, the stock payoﬀ
is normally distributed with mean µ and variance σ2. The representative market-
maker has CARA utility with risk aversion parameter γ. Suppose that every investor
has ﬁnanced the purchase of the stock with margin. We assume that the investor
will face a margin call, and will be forced to liquidate if her wealth (including the
stock) falls too much. If an investor cannot meet the margin requirement, she will
be forced to liquidate her share at date 1. If she can meet the margin requirement,
it will be optimal for her to do so and hold the stock to date 2. Below, we propose
a reasonable speciﬁcation contrasting the component of external income that can
be allocated to covering margin constraints to the amount of margin that investors
have to provide.
Suppose, for example, a representative investor had purchased shares at price
p (determined outside the model), and let m ∈ [0,1] represent the proportion of
the investment ﬁnanced with margin. Thus, if the price falls from p to p0, this
investor would need to come up with cash of m·(p − p0) in order to hold onto the
shares until the ﬁnal period. One could then interpret the margin constraints to
be triggered by a decline in price from the purchase price p to p0 (a return), rather
than just being driven by a low price level per se.
Each investor has an external source of income at date 0. This external income ˜ W
is assumed to be distributed uniformly over the interval [0,B]and is independent of
23any stock price movements. Therefore, the endogenous probability of liquidation
is given by












≡ c0 + c1·α, (12)
where κ ≡ γ·σ2/2, c0 ≡ m·(p − µ)/B, and c1 ≡ m·κ/B (> 0). We consider only the
case where the income shocks are perfectly correlated, i.e., all or no investors face
a liquidity shock at date 1 depending on the realization of ˜ W.10
Theorem 4 If (i) B>p>µ>κwhere κ ≡ γ·σ2/2; (ii) B is suﬃciently large; and (iii)
income shocks are perfectly correlated, then there is a unique tendering equilibrium,
α∗ ∈ (0,1), in which α∗ increases in m, κ, and (p − µ) and decreases in B.11
Proof: In the perfectly correlated income shocks case we have p0 = µ−κ·α if α proportion
tender at date 0, and p1 = µ − κ·(1 + α) if all remaining investors are forced to liquidate
at date 1. Substituting these two price functions and the liquidation probability (12) into
(2) yields
F(α)≡ κ·[(c0 + c1·α)·(1 + α) − α] . (13)
First, note that F(0) = κ·c0 > 0,s oα = 0 is not an equilibrium. Second, note that
F(1) = κ·[2·(c0 + c1) − 1]<0 by assumptions (i) and (ii), so α = 1 is not an equilibrium.
Finally, Fα = κ·[c0 + c1 + 2·c0·α − 1]<0 by assumptions (i) and (ii), so there is a unique
α∗ ∈ (0,1) such that F(α∗) = 0.
The comparative statics results follow from the facts that (i) Fc0 = κ·(1 + α) > 0; (ii)
Fc1 = κ·α·(1 + α) > 0; (iii) c0 is increasing in m and p and decreasing in B and µ; (iv) c1






> 0 when B is suﬃciently large.
10The independent liquidity shocks case solution involves cubic equations. It is diﬃcult to ﬁnd
the parameter restrictions ensuring a unique equilibrium so that we can do the comparative statics.
However, there is no reason why the intuition of the equilibrium discussed in this section would
not carry over to the independent liquidity shock scenario.
11The restrictions (i) B>p>µ>κand (ii) B suﬃciently large are made for the following
reasons: The assumption µ>κensures that p0 > 0 so we get a meaningful margin requirement.
The assumption p>µensures that we are considering cases where the price of the stock has
fallen from the time it was purchased so that we can consider the eﬀect of margin calls. Finally,
the assumption B suﬃciently large ensures an interior solution for α∗.I f B is not large enough
the probability of not meeting the margin call at date 1 is very high and the only equilibrium we
get at date 0 is everyone tendering (which has no interesting comparative statics).
24The intuition for the comparative statics are straightforward:
Margin Constraint (m): the more investors can borrow, the greater will be the ten-
dering proportion at date 0, because it is less likely that investors will be able
to meet margin calls at date 1.
Original Purchase Price (p): Similarly, the more investors paid relative to the cur-
rent mean (p − µ), the greater the tendering proportion at date 0, because it
is less likely investors will be able to meet the margin call at date 1. One way
to interpret p − µ is the innovation in beliefs from purchase of the stock to
now. This states that if there is a big negative shock to beliefs, then margin
calls exacerbate the price move through early liquidation: this is overreaction
to bad news. However, there is no overreaction to good news, because there
is not a margin call in that case!
Eﬀective Variance (κ): The greater the eﬀective variance, the more likely investors
face margin calls at date 1, because the market-makers’ demand curve is more
steeply sloped. Thus, the higher is the tendering proportion at date 0.
Expected Income (B): The higher external expected income is likely to be (to meet
future margin calls), the smaller is the tendering proportion at date 0.
Our particular underlying margin assumptions have produced the particular lin-
ear mapping of price declines into liquidation probabilities in (12). However, this
equation should only be considered an illustrative sketch for brevity of exposition:
in the real world, diﬀerent investors would purchase at diﬀerent price points and
face diﬀerent margin constraints. The important aspect of our sketch is the pres-
ence of some positive feedback trading in the event of a crash, where a lower price
25can also increase the probability of future liquidation needs, which gave us an ex-
plicit speciﬁcation for s(p0 ) and therefore s(α). The liquidity run phenomenon
then interacts with and rationally ampliﬁes this feedback trading (Shleifer (2000)).
One could also entertain altogether diﬀerent mechanisms that accomplish the link
from stock prices to liquidation probabilities. For example, one could write down
a model in which risk management systems, principal-agent problems, or limited
horizons induce investors to be more likely to liquidate when stock prices fall. Or,
one could estimate an empirical relation on the data itself without writing down
a speciﬁc model. Thus, one could entertain other reduced-form price-liquidation
probability linkages. Indeed, for the special case c0 = 0 and c1 = 1, there are three
equilibria: one stable one in which no investor tenders and therefore no investor
is afraid of liquidation; a stable one in which every investor tenders because every
investor tenders; and one in which there is an interior tendering equilibrium. In
this case, one might even observe a sudden equilibrium switch, where one moment
noone was afraid of a liquidity shock and the next moment everyone is afraid of
liquidity shock. The relationships between prices and liquidation probabilities need
not be linear either. However, further such modeling could detract from the main
intuition of our paper: when there are some feedback eﬀects from the underlying
stock price to liquidation probabilities, the fear of future needs to liquidate can
cause potentially rapid and violent liquidity runs.
26IV Discussion, Extensions, and Welfare
A Preventing Runs and Front-Running: Time-Varying Market Depth
The obvious question is what mechanisms could prevent the need for the market-
making sector to absorb run inventory from the public.
The ﬁrst answer lies in the enforcement of perfect sequentiality. With sequential
execution the last investors (who now know they are the last investors!) would be
better oﬀ just waiting it out instead of being the last in-the-run investors. This
can unravel the tendering equilibrium. In response to the 1987 crash, the NYSE
massively expanded its communication infrastructure, a mechanism to prevent the
conversion of the sequential market into a random-execution market in times of
declines.
Interestingly, a belief that one can front-run others (get their share sales exe-
cuted with higher priority) can encourage run equilibria because it increases the ex-
pected payoﬀ to tendering early.12 Naturally, in an equilibrium with homogeneous
agents, noone can expect to front-run anyone else. However, in a real-world context,
some heterogeneous investors may rationally or irrationally believe in their ability
to front-run. Portfolio insurance may be an example of a strategy that attempts to
precommit to withdraw funds in the case of large moves, which will thus worsen the
liquidity eﬀects described in our own paper. Leland and Rubinstein (1988, p.46f)
describe some possible front-running in 1987: “With the sudden fall in the market
during the last half hour of trading on October 16, many insurers found themselves
with an overhang of unﬁlled sell orders going into Monday. In addition, several
12Within the context of the informational cascades literature (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and
Welch (1992), Welch (1992)), Chen (1995b) has modelled such informational interactions in a bank-
ing run context.
27smart institutional traders knew about this overhang and tried to exit the market
early Monday before the insurers could complete their trades.”
The second answer lies in providing liquidity during runs. If the market-making
sector were to expand only in “bad” situations but oﬀer lousy execution in “good”
situations, then each investor would be relatively better oﬀ not trading into the
market today, and instead would be relatively more eager to try to wait it out. It
is straightforward to solve a model that proves this point. For simplicity, we ana-
lyze the case in which the representative market-maker has CARA utility and the
stock payoﬀ is normally distributed. We also assume that the liquidity shocks are
perfectly correlated across investors (the independent liquidity shocks case yields
similar qualitative results). In this example, we allow the market-making sector to
be deeper at date 1 than at date 0 (i.e., γt=1 ≤ γt=0). Again, we assume that prices
are set at each date by a zero-utility condition. However, the new prices reﬂect
the diﬀerent market-making depth at each date. Thus, p0(α)= µ − γ0σ2α/2 and
p1(1 − α;α)= µ − (1 + α)γ1σ2/2. Substituting p0(α)and p1(1 − α;α)into our
deﬁnition of F(α)yields the following result:
Theorem 5 If the market-making sector is deeper at date 1 (i.e., γ1 <γ 0) and liquidity










if s ≤ γ0/(2·γ1)
1 if s>γ 0/(2·γ1)
. (14)
Proof: Substitute the pricing functions into equation 2. Note that F(0)>0 for all s>0
and Fα , the derivative of F with respect to α , is negative since γ1 <γ 0. Thus, there are
two possibilities. If F(1) ≥ 0 then there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium α  = 1 and
if F(1)<0 there is a unique mixed strategy, α , where F(α  ) = 0. For s>γ 0/(2·γ1),
F(1)>0 thus α  = 1. For s ≤ γ0/(2·γ1) solving for α  yields the result. 
28Market-making inventory α  decreases in γ0 and increases in γ1. If early on,
market makers are more risk-averse (γ0 is high), investors are less eager to tender
to market-makers at time 0 (α  is low) and more inclined to take the chance of being
forced to sell if personally hit by a subsequent liquidity shock. Conversely, if the
subsequent “standby liquidity” in a crisis is low, because the market-making risk
aversion γ1 is then unusually high, the post-run price will be lower, which prompts
investors to be more eager to sell at date 0. Casual empiricism suggests that, if
anything, the market-making sector becomes intrinsically more risk-averse during
runs than it is in ordinary times. Thus, government intervention which commits
to provide market-depth in “bad” but not in “good” times might usefully mitigate
run ineﬃciencies. This gives a natural interpretation to government intervention: if
correctly done, standby liquidity in market runs could help prevent runs in the ﬁrst
place. (It is unlikely that the private sector could provide unusually good liquidity
only in bad scenarios, but not in good scenarios.) Interestingly, non-intervention
in good markets is as important as intervention in bad markets! Indeed, this is the
equivalent of the national petroleum reserves, which are rarely released, but whose
presence may in itself prevent runs. Greenwald and Stein (1988, p.19) discuss an
alternative mechanism, in which large ﬁnancial insurers would agree to cover some
of the losses of market-makers if the market drops signiﬁcantly. However, there
is anecdotal evidence that many such institutions often run portfolio-insurance
schemes and tend to sell more into a crash rather than against a crash (footnote 4).
B A Multi-Period View
The single-period setting of our model is important in one sense but not another.
Our model requires that uncertainty is resolved while market-makers hold shares
29that investors—fearing liquidity shocks—have oﬄoaded on them. Consequently, we
do not believe our model applies to situations in which market-makers can leisurely
unravel their holdings with little risk (e.g., over many periods without uncertainty).
However, our model is robust to multiple trading periods before a potential liquidity
shock can come about. That is, given many trading opportunities prior to a potential
liquidity shock, every investor would want to oﬄoad shares immediately to avoid
having to trade behind other investors. In periods between this ﬁrst period and the
period of the potential future shock, investors voluntarily do not trade. Thus, a
liquidity run can occur even if the liquidity shock is far away.
This is easy to show. Suppose investors now have two opportunities to sell,
denoted date 0 and date 1, prior to the occurance of a liquidity shock. Now, an
equilibrium is a pair (α0, α1), for which—given that α0 proportion sell at date 0—
it is optimal for an α1 proportion to sell at date 1, and vice-versa. One condition
for optimality is that someone who sells at one date does not have the incentive
to deviate and sell at the other date. But there is only one case for which this
is true: α proportion sell at date 0 and no one sells at date 1! In this case, the
date 0 price exceeds the date 1 price so no one has an incentive to deviate and
sell at date 1. Moreover, the possibility of a liquidity shock in the future makes an
investor indiﬀerent between selling at date 0 and waiting if she conjectures that α 
(as in our earlier model) proportion of investors will sell at date 0. Note that the
opposite is not an equilibrium, i.e. no one sells at date 0 and α proportion sell at
date 1 because the date 0 price will be higher, permitting investors to front-run and
thus proﬁt by selling at date 0. In sum, the only equilibrium is the same α  as in
our earlier model: ﬁrst, active selling at date 0, followed by no more selling until
30the date at which the liquidity shock occurs.13
However, the investor liquidity shocks must be simultaneous: it is the period
with the highest probability of liquidity shocks that would matter, not the average
or cumulative probability of a liquidity shock. Luckily, many constraints seem to
appear at roughly the same relevant time for many participants: a high-frequency
ﬁnancial market drop or a low-frequency economic depression may force many
individuals to seek liquidity at the same time.
Naturally, changes inmodelparameters mightcause somereadjustmentsas time
goes by. We have already sketched the inﬂuence of time-varying market depths in
Subsection A. Similarly, one could imagine time-varying probability assessments of
future liquidity shocks, which could lead to active trading and time-varying market-
making inventory adjustments, even in the absence of any current liquidity shocks.
(Incidentally, such a model can easily explain relatively high trading volume in the
presence of only mild news.)
C The Social Cost of Investor Fear
In our model, there is no asymmetric information or trading costs–and yet the mar-
ket outcome can be signiﬁcantly worse than the Pareto-optimal allocation. In what
follows, we analyze the social cost of investor fear when market-makers have CARA
utility and the stock payoﬀ is normally distributed. Our analysis considers exoge-
nous liquidity shocks which are either perfectly correlated or independent across
investors.
13Note that in this independent shocks version of our model, we must again resort to a competi-
tive market-making sector to prevent an individual market-maker to exploit to wait for the vulture
opportunity.
31C.1 Perfectly correlated liquidity shocks
In what follows, our benchmark is not a price of µ, but a requirement that risk-
neutral investors must not sell at date 0 (similar to the analysis in Diamond and
Dybvig (1983)). In this Pareto-optimal outcome, the risk-neutral investors hold all
the shares at date 0 and sell to the market-making sector at date 1 only if they are
actually hit by a liquidity shock. Consequently, every investor would sell shares with
probability s at a price p1 = µ − γ·σ2
/2 (assuming that the market-maker sector
executes these sell orders at a price that yields no utility gain for them) and would






In the batch-execution model, risk-neutral investor sell with probability α  at date 0
at the average price p0 = µ − (γ·α ·σ2)/2, liquidate with probability (1 − α )·s at
date 1 at the average price p1 = µ − (1 + α )·γ·σ2]/2, and retain shares with













By assumption, the market making sector has zero expected utility gain thus a
total welfare comparison only requires a comparison of the investors’ utility. Simple
algebra shows that equilibrium welfare (expected selling price) is below the Pareto-







(1−s) if s ≤ 1/2
γ·σ2
2 ·(1 − s) if s>1/2
(17)
The Pareto-inferior outcome is caused by a prisoner’s dilemma among risk-
neutral investors that cannot easily be overcome. The welfare loss is increasing in
the market-maker’s risk-aversion and the payoﬀ variance σ2 since ineﬃcient risk-
sharing is exacerbated. Finally, the welfare loss is greatest when s = 1/2 because
the market-making sector must absorb all shares in this case, not just those of the
liquidity-shocked individuals. Because α  increases at a faster rate as s approaches
1/2, the welfare loss increases in s for s ∈ [0,0.5). However, because (i) α  = 1
for all s ≥ 1/2 and (ii) as s increases the market makers would hold an increasing
proportion of shares in the Pareto-optimal outcome, the welfare loss decreases in s
for s ∈ (0.5,1].
C.2 Independent liquidity shocks
In the Pareto-optimal outcome, the risk-neutral investors hold all the shares and
sell to the market-making sector only if they are actually hit by a liquidity shock.
In this case, investors sell shares with probability s at a price p1 = µ − γ·sσ2
/2
(assuming that the market-maker sector executes these sell orders at a price that
yields no utility gain for them) and would retain shares with probability 1 − s (with





33In the batch-execution model, risk-neutral investor sell with probability α  at date 0
at the average price p0 = µ − (γ·α ·σ2)/2, liquidate with probability (1 − α )·s at
date 1 at the average price p1 = µ − [2·α  + (1 − α )·s]γ·σ2/2, and retain shares













As in the perfectly correlated case, the welfare loss is increasing in γ and σ2 and
the welfare cost is greatest when s = 1/2.
D Some Final Thoughts
Contagion eﬀects across investors fall naturally out of the model. In the bad sce-
nario, there are spillovers in the decisions of investors to sell their shares. This
causes each individual investor to fear that he may have to sell (for exogenous rea-
sons) behind every other investor. If selling late, he will get only the marginal price
after everyone else has already sold to the market-making sector, which—already
being burdened with the inventory of all other investors—can only oﬀer a very low
price.
The negative payoﬀ externalities among investors causes an accelerator eﬀect,
in which just small increases in the probability of future liquidity shocks cause
a large layoﬀ of risky shares onto the risk-averse market-making sector. Again,
the accelerator eﬀect does not amplify the eﬀects of the actual liquidity shock! It
ampliﬁes the extent to which one investor’s fear of a future liquidity shock has a
negative spillover on other investors’ fears.
34The idea of ﬁnancial contagion and spillover eﬀects across markets and institu-
tions, as modelled, e.g., in Allen and Gale (2000), also apply naturally to our scenario.
By expanding the domain of liquidity runs from ﬁnancial institutions to ﬁnancial
markets, our model suggests that cross-liquidity constraints could be more impor-
tant than previously thought. Financial crises could transmit not only from one
institution to another, but across both ﬁnancial institutions and ﬁnancial markets.
We have repeatedly pointed out that runs are not caused by liquidity shocks
themselves, but by fears of future liquidity shocks. The probability of a future liq-
uidity shock may constantly ﬂuctuate, even though the liquidity shock itself can be
oﬀ on the horizon. Consequently, an empiricist can observe dramatic price move-
ments and market-making inventory changes without observing any actual liquidity
shocks. And, for the rare empiricist able to measure the fear of liquidity shocks (s),
depending on its value, seemingly small changes can cause large sudden changes
in the desire of investors to unload shares onto the market-making sector.14
V Related Literature
Our ﬁnancial markets runs model has both similarities and diﬀerences to the ﬁnan-
cial intermediation runs models, foremost Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Our model
is also driven by investor liquidity shocks and payoﬀ externalities. However, our
model does not require a sequential service constraint, productive ineﬃciencies, or
a total loss if an investor fails to join a run.15 Indeed, working out the endogenous
14Although our model has emphasized purely rational behavior, where the fear of liquidity
shocks is rationally assessed or derived from margin constraints, our equilibrium could also be
embedded in a world of “non-rational behavioral economics,” if the fear of a liquidity shock (the
need to terminate an investment early during a market run) were itself non-rational.
15Allen and Gale (2000) and similar ﬁnancial contagion models, though quite diﬀerent, build on
the Diamond and Dybvig framework and retain these two assumptions. The same can be stated
35pricing and market inventory is a major focus of our paper. Also, in both cases, a
“lender of last resort” can prevent the run.
There is also related literature on stock market crashes. Grossman and Miller
(1988) present a two trading period model in which all traders are not simultane-
ously present in the market. In the ﬁrst period, there is a temporary order imbalance
which must be absorbed by market makers. Between the ﬁrst and second period,
new information arrives about the security so the market-making sector is exposed
to risk. However, the market-making sector is small and has low risk absorption
capacity. Thus, the equilibrium price falls more than if all traders were available
to absorb the imbalance. In the second period, the remaining traders arrive to
buy some of the market makers inventory and the price rises. The key feature of
their model which produces crashes is the asynchronous arrival of traders in the
market, combined with the limited risk-bearing capacity of market makers. Green-
wald and Stein (1991) extend the Grossman and Miller (1988) analysis by assuming
that traders can only submit market orders in the second period of trade. This in-
troduces transactional risk (uncertainty about the price at which their trades will
execute) which reduces the willingness of buyers to absorb the market makers in-
ventory in the second period. Knowing this, the market makers demand a larger
risk premium in the ﬁrst period to absorb the temporary order imbalance, which
causes prices to fall even further than in the Grossman and Miller analysis. Like
Greenwald and Stein (1991), we permit only market orders and have an uncertain
execution price.
Although our model is closest in spirit Greenwald and Stein (1991), it is quite
diﬀerent. First and foremost, runs in our model occur when investors think that
for the liquidity crisis and international runs on currency reserves literature, e.g., Caballero and
Krishnamurthy (2001). Geanakoplos (2001) embeds collateral crises into a broader model.
36others will tender and therefore choose to tender themselves. In Greenwald and
Stein, there are no runs (deﬁned as “I tender because I think you will tender”) in the
spirit of bank runs. Rather, Greenwald and Stein (1991) have crashes in price be-
cause the uncertain execution price with batch orders introduces an extra risk which
makes the price fall further than if investors could submit limit orders. Second, our
ﬁnancial market runs are endogenous and are not driven by asynchronous trading
arrivals or exogenous supply shocks. Indeed, the Greenwald and Stein (1991) model
is driven by the uncertainty in the number of arriving value traders, an uncertainty
which does not even exist in our model. Third, the negative externality in their
model is that value buyers may destroy the value opportunities for other buyers. In
our model, the negative externality derives from investor selling, not buying. Fur-
ther, this ever-present negative externality forces market-makers to hold a socially
suboptimal inventory of shares. And ﬁnally, they argue that circuit-breakers might
help: in our model, circuit-breakers are counterproductive.
There are also other areas of research more distant in spirit, but which also ex-
plain facets of ﬁnancial market crashes. There is a large literature examining the
impact of portfolio insurance (e.g., Grossman (1988), Brennan and Schwartz (1989),
Genotte and Leland (1990), Jacklin, Kleidon, and Pﬂeiderer (1992), Donaldson and
Uhlig (1993), Grossman and Zhou (1994), Basak (1995)). Portfolio insurers are usu-
ally modelled as agents who display positive feedback trading (of an accelerating
kind) for exogenous (often assumed) reasons. This literature’s primary goal is to
show that portfolio insurers can exacerbate crashes (discontinuous movements).
Models diﬀer in choosing discrete single-shot vs. continuous time modelling tech-
niques, implications on what portfolio insurance does for general price volatility in
ordinary markets, and in how asymmetric information matters. Our own model dif-
37fers from this literature in that the reason for selling is not the (usually exogenous)
consumption motive, but the direct negative externality arising endogenously from
other investors’ trading.
Other papers have also presented ingenious mechanisms that can elicit large
price changes. In Madrigal and Scheinkman (1997), an informed strategic market-
maker attempting to control both the order ﬂow she receives and the information
revealed to the market by the prices she sets may choose an equilibrium price sched-
ule that is discontinuous in order ﬂow thus prompting large changes in price for
arbitrarily small changes in market conditions. In Romer (1993), uncertainty about
the quality of others’ information is revealed by trading, and large price movements,
such as the October 1987 crash, may be caused not by news about fundamentals
but rather by the trading process itself. In Sandroni (1998), market crashes can be a
self-fulﬁlling prophecy when agents have diﬀerent discount rates and diﬀerent be-
liefs about the likelihood of rare events (even if these beliefs converge in the limit).
Barlevi and Veronesi (2001) present a model in which uninformed traders precip-
itate a stock price crash because as prices fall they rationally infer that informed
traders have negative information which leads them to reduce their demand for the
stock and drive its price even lower. The key feature of their model is that the unin-
formed traders have locally upward sloping demand curves which, when combined
with the informed’s downward sloping demands, can generate an equilibrium price
function discontinuous in fundamentals.
Finally, we are not the ﬁrst to employ margin constraints to generate (multiple)
equilibria. In Chowdhry and Nanda (1998), perhaps the paper most similar to our
own endogenous liquidity constraint section, some investors engage in margin bor-
rowing to obtain their desired investment portfolio. Because shares can be used as
38collateral there is a link between the price of the stock and the capacity to invest in it
which introduces the possibility of multiple equilibria. For example, lower (higher)
stock prices can be a self-fulﬁlling equilibrium because it diminishes (increases) the
capacity for levered investors to purchases their desired amount of stock which in
turn makes the price fall (rise) rational.16
VI Conclusion
Our paper has developed a theory of ﬁnancial market runs: socially ineﬃciently
largemarket-makinginventoryinbatchorrandom-orderingﬁnancialmarkets. Batch
markets are the standard stock market opening mechanism and auction mechanism
on some foreign exchanges. Random-ordering markets are common in many over-
the-counter markets. They also can occur (infrequently) after a large price drop,
when limited communication channels between investors and the ﬁnancial system
fail and break down the perfect sequentiality of execution. In such cases, investors’
fears of future liquidity constraints can cause a prisoner’s dilemma among investors
today. This destroys eﬃcient risk-sharing and aggravates any fundamental price
drops.
Aside from sequential execution and reasonable fear of liquidity shocks (but
not necessarily actual liquidity shocks), our model required very little machinery.
Thus, it is the (presumably rare) combination of breakdown of sequential execution
and a common fear of liquidity shocks, perhaps caused by or related to margin
constraints, that facilitates a run on a ﬁnancial market.
16For a more recent example, Yuan (2000) demonstrates that margin constraints can be beneﬁcial
because they may apply to informed investors and thus reduce the adverse selection problem with
uninformed investors.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Comparative statics when investors face independent liquidity shocks. Our base
parameters are a down-stock-value of D = 10 and an up-stock-value U = 20 with
equal probability π = 0.5, a risk aversion coeﬃcient of γ = 3, and market-making
wealth of W = 1.5 (i.e., roughly 1/10 of the value of the ﬁnancial market).
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